Impact of Immigration on Welfare : political economy of the welfare states : a comparative study by Samuel, Danielle D.
May 2014
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
School of Slavonic and East European Studies
UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI
Faculty of Social Science
Economic and Social History 
Danielle D. Samuel
IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON WELFARE SYSTEMS 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WELFARE STATES: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
Master’s Thesis
Supervisor: Sakari Heikkinen 
 Abstract 
A recent report by the UN shows that international migration flows is at the highest,
with  more people  than  ever  before  living  abroad,  reported  figures  suggest  that  232
million,  or  3.2 per  cent  of  the  world’s  population  are migrants  in  2013,  defined as
persons living outside their  country of birth.  In comparison to  figures of 2000; 175
million and 1990; 154 million, there has been significant increase in mobility.
International migration is a global occurrence that is constantly evolving in its capacity,
complexity  and  impact; it  is  not  just  a  social  symptom,  but  also  a  process  with  a
complex causality system that permeates  almost  every aspect  of our everyday lives.
Migration  is  both a  source and consequence  of wider  development  processes and a
fundamental  aspect  of  our  increasingly  globalizing  world.   Increased  mobility,  the
complexity of migratory patterns,  its  impact  on migrants,  families,  communities  and
countries have ensured that international migration become and remain a priority for
most nations. Observations have shown that migration occurs in well-defined streams,
migrants  generally  progress  along  a  specific  route  towards  specified  destinations;
mainly  due  to  established  transportation  routes  and  partly  due  to  highly  localized
opportunities (Lee, 1966). This paper will argue that this is true for both humanitarian
and labour migrants, it hypothesizes that both sets of migrants are somewhat informed
of their destination country prior to making the decision to migrate for work or asylum.
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Problem Statement 
How important are the ‘pull’ factors of the welfare state in influencing the migration
decision of asylum seekers and labour migrants to the UK and Finland. How does the
interaction between organizational (immigration policy) and individual factors impact
results?
1.2. Motivation 
The European Union’s (EU) population has shown a continued growth since the 1960’s
to present; recent figures from Eurostat shows that the EU271 population as of the 1st
January 2012 was an estimated 503.7 million; an increase of 1.3 million people from the
previous year.  The EU-27 inhabitants grew by more than 100 million persons from the
reported figure in 1960 of 402.6 million. Whilst a natural increase2 accounted for an
added 0.4 million (32 %) of the population growth in the EU-27 in 2011, the remaining
68  %  was  resultant  of  net  migration3,  which  continues  to  be  the  main  cause  of
population growth, contributing 0.9 million in 20114 (Eurostat, 2013).  A recent report
by the UN shows that international migration flows is at the highest, with more people
than ever before living abroad, reported figures suggest that 232 million, or 3.2 per cent
of the world’s population are migrants in 2013, defined as persons living outside their
country of birth. In comparison to figures of 2000; 175 million and 1990; 154 million,
there has been significant  increase in mobility.  This  global  estimate includes  labour
migrants, their families, asylum seekers and refugees.  Of these international migrants5
approximately 59 per cent live in developed countries and the remaining 41 per cent in
the developing world. Figure 1.16 below illustrates the changes and projected changes in
population over time from 1950-2050 for developed and developing regions  (United
1 Now EU-28 with the accession of Croatia on 1st July 2013- This Thesis though will only mention EU-27 as all statistical information gathered relate to EU-27 countries only. 2  The positive difference between live births and deaths 3  Net Migration- Total number of immigrants less total emigrants4 For more details see; Key figures on Europe — 2013 edition Eurostat 5 International migrants are considered as foreign born or foreign citizens. 6 For more facts and figures on Europe and the World,  see; The International Migration Report2013 
Nations, 2013a). It suggests that the net change in population of developing countries
will  begin  to  decrease  from  2020  onwards  and  net  migration  will  continue  to  be
negative: implying that more people will continue to migrate outwards. Simultaneously
developed nations will also witness a decline in net population change, likely resultant
of characteristically ageing populations and low fertility rates, however net migration is
projected to continue growing at relatively steady pace.    
Figure 1.1. Contribution of natural increase and net migration to total population change by development group, 
1950-1960 to 2040-2050 (millions)
The International Migration report 2013 tells us that Europe as a region has had the
second largest addition of international migrants between 1990 and 2013 (23 million),
wit some 52 per cent of these being born within the area (ibid: 3).  These EU migration
flows occurred  during a  period  of  falling  population  growth and an increase  in  the
average age of EU residents, with the average age of citizens being 41.2 years in 2011.
This  change  in  demography  will  undoubtedly  engender  significant  changes  in  the
coming years,  undoubtedly some of  which are already occurring.  The working-age7
population in 2011 accounted for 66.9 per cent of the total EU-27’s population, young
7 Aged 15-64
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people8 accounting for only 15.6 per cent and older persons9 the remaining 17.5 per cent
(Eurostat,  2013).   The number  of  elderly is  expected to  rise  substantially  given the
percentage of working-aged and the current median EU age, this presents a problem for
both the labour market and the welfare state. 
Modern welfare states  according to many experts  are  said to  be in  a state  of crisis
summarized  broadly  as  having  been  derived  from:  market-distortions10,  calamitous
long-term effects  of population ageing11 and a new global economy that  reprimands
profligate  governments  and uncompetitive  economies  (Esping-Andersen,  1996).   Of
equal interest and additional to the discourse on welfare states in crisis and their future
continuity are the effects of globalization. According to Iversen (2001) there are two
conflicting  views,  with  the  pessimist  viewing  globalization  as  a  threat  to  the
continuation of the Keynesian welfare states and the optimist, who views globalization
as compatible with and strengthening to the welfare state. 
With aging populations and falling birth rates, there is a greater reliance on immigrants
to aid in stabilizing economies and maintaining populations (Robinson, 2005; Hedetoft,
2006; Tienda and Haskins, 2011; Esping-Andersen, 1996). Surprisingly, discourses on
the  consequences  of  immigration  inflow  are  more  focused  on  the  cost/benefits  of
cultural  diversity  as  opposed  to  the  economic  cost/benefits  of  immigration  inflows
(Bisin et al., 2008).  For Finland and UK, their welfare states are the centre of gravity,
particularly  over  the  last  few decades  and  continuing.  Though,  as  important  as  the
welfare state is to the fiscal policy of these two countries it is not without its polemics
surrounding its role and function. Much of which is focused on the immigration debate
and the controversial issue of immigrants’ actual or potential use of the host country’s
welfare  systems.   Evidence  suggests  that  there  is  an  increased  participation  of
immigrants  in  the  welfare  programmes  of  rich  countries  (Borjas,  1994;  Borjas  and
Hilton,  1996;  and  Borjas,  2011).  Furthermore,  poor  immigrants  with  limited
employment prospects tend to cluster in countries with high welfare benefits.  The very
8 Aged 0-149 Aged over 65 10 The argument is that welfare states stifles markets and erodes ones motivation to work, save andinvest.11 Ageing populations poses a challenge for welfare states,  with growing elderly populations inneed of more assistance and services. 
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real probability of immigrants benefiting disproportionately from welfare systems and
becoming a fiscal burden on public finances and taxpayers is a common argument in
favour of political  support for higher welfare standards and increased restrictions on
immigration.   Sinn (2002) cited by Hansen (2003) suggests that countries with open
borders and generous welfare systems attract immigrants who receive more from the
public sector than they contribute in taxes.  Many of the policy changes in Western
countries  of  the  recent  past  have  been in  direct  response to  these migratory effects
(Myers and Papageorgiou, 2000).
International migration is a global occurrence that is constantly evolving in its capacity,
complexity  and  impact; it  is  not  just  a  social  symptom,  but  also  a  process  with  a
complex causality system that permeates  almost  every aspect  of our everyday lives.
Migration  is  both a  source and consequence  of wider  development  processes and a
fundamental  aspect  of  our  increasingly  globalizing  world.   Increased  mobility,  the
complexity of migratory patterns,  its  impact  on migrants,  families,  communities  and
countries have ensured that international migration become and remain a priority for
most nations. Observations have shown that migration occurs in well-defined streams,
migrants  generally  progress  along  a  specific  route  towards  specified  destinations;
mainly  due  to  established  transportation  routes  and  partly  due  to  highly  localized
opportunities (Lee, 1966). This paper will argue that this is true for both humanitarian
and labour migrants, it hypothesizes that both sets of migrants are somewhat informed
of their destination country prior to making the decision to migrate for work or asylum.
The harmonisation of European Immigration policies and subsequent expansion of the
EU  in  2004  have  given  rise  to  discourses  around  the  ‘pull’  factor  of  welfare.
Furthermore, there are those that argue that the creation of the European ‘single market’
is at the expense of welfare integration, accompanied by expansive immigration policies
and a greater need for rigorous control measures12. However, there is still a demand for
migrants to fill the gaps in the labour market created by ageing populations and the
declining interests of natives in filling positions in low-skilled jobs. Employment not
only serves to meet the basic needs for food, clothing, shelter and recreation, but also
aids in the redistribution process13 .The creation of the EU’s ‘single market’ has made it
12 See for example Schierup et al., 2006; Sinn, 1997; and Givens and Luedke, 2004. 13 Redistribution is the transfer of income, wealth or property from some individuals  to othersthrough a social mechanism such as taxation, monetary policies, welfare etc. 
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possible to benefit from increased trade and a division of labour through the guarantees
of its ‘four-freedoms’; the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labour, across
member  states  (Sinn,  1998).  Whilst  beneficial,  simultaneously,  these  four  liberties
augments  the  competitive  pressures  on  the  national  fiscal  economies,  and creates  a
challenge in the desire to limit access to those that will present a fiscal burden (welfare
migrants  and  asylum  seekers).  The  distribution  of  immigrants’  across  European
countries has been far from even. Numerous rationalizations can be offered, including
both  institutional  factors  and  individual  opportunities.  This  paper  contends  that
migration  outcomes  are  a  direct  result  of  an  amalgamation  between  structural  and
individual factors. The relationship between institutional measures, policies, migration
systems and aspirations of the individual can present complexities. The main objective
of this paper is to consider the interaction between organizational and individual factors
that determines immigrant destinations through the consideration of the influences at
work,  i.e.  welfare  states  and immigration  policies.  The study presents  two differing
immigration  regimes  within  differing  welfare  state  settings  to  demonstrate  the
interaction between the two types of policies. The assessment of the economic outcomes
is based largely on literature reviews on (1) the impact of immigration policy and the
welfare state on the selection of immigrants, and (2) the impact of immigration on the
host country’s economy. It will explore whether the welfare state presents a magnet pull
for immigration in the cases of both Finland and the UK. It will also attempt to connect
the variation in welfare typology with variations in migration flow and explore the role
of  immigration  and asylum policies  of  both countries  in  this  nexus.  To answer  the
motivating question of the thesis, I provide a survey of the literature, especially from
cross-national  studies.  References from several disciplines  within social  sciences are
utilized. Using a descriptive analysis of existing statistical information available from
Eurostat,  ILO,  OECD  and  the  UN,  generalizations  and  inferences  surrounding  the
movement of immigrants to the UK and Finland.  In summary, I examine how welfare
state regime, immigration policy, and individual choice shapes or determines patterns of
flow to the selected countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section will  discuss in some
details migration theories and present a summary of the relevant theoretical approaches.
Section  3,  will  present  a  comprehensive  literature  review  on  the  subjects  of
humanitarian,  voluntary  migration  and  welfare,  concluding  with  an  overview  of
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literature on the immigration-welfare nexus. Section 4 will discuss the methodological
approach; section 5 will present the relationship between welfare regimes, immigration
and asylum policy and welfare. A concluding chapter (6) follows which will discuss the
main findings and submit recommendations for future approach. 
2. Determinants of Migration: An Assessment of Theory 
 “Migration means life and progress; a sedentary population stagnation”,  Ravenstein
(1885) cited by Lee (1966). In advance economies, differences in locale are highlighted
by  industrial  development  and  the  differences  among  people  by  education.
Simultaneously, intervening obstacles to migration within the country are lessened by
improving  technology  and  by  political  design.  The  same  can  be  expected  between
nations,  and  thus  we should  anticipate  and  witness  large  waives  of  immigration  to
developed nations  and within them high rates  of  internal  migration.  Equally,  in  the
developing nations,  we anticipate  a  largely immobile  population,  whose populace is
changed under  duress  (conflict  driven)  and en masse  rather  than  through individual
action (ibid: 54). Irrespective of the length of stay, difficulties or ease of doing so, the
act  of migration  involves  a  place of  origin,  a destination and an intervening set  of
obstacles (ibid: 49).  The subject of international migration has yielded much research
in  the  last  few decades  and continues  to  do so within  our  continuously globalising
world.  Labour migration has become an increasingly popular choice for individuals,
providing them with the necessary means to assist in the care of family members back
home  in  the  form  of  remittances.  To  understand  the  push  and  pull  factors  of  an
individual’s  migration  decision  it  is  perhaps  essential  foremost  to  understand  why
international migration occurs. 
A multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary subject,  migration  studies  has  generated  an
abundance of research and several theoretical approaches in their attempts to discern
and understand why people move. A variety of theoretical models have been developed
to explain the international flow of human capital. From the ‘neoclassical’ approach to
the ‘historical-structuralist’ and most recently the new economics of labour migration
perspective, each theory formulated ultimately seeks to expound on this issue, though
they utilise different frames of reference, notions and suppositions.  Supplementary to
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these  studies  on  the  causes  of  migration,  other  related  theoretical  approaches  have
pursued other aspects of the migratory process such as the migration networks theory14
and the migrations systems theory15. The following pages will however focus on the
aforementioned  perspectives;  neoclassical  and NELM and additionally  ‘Dual  labour
market theory’, the ‘push and pull’ migration theory and ‘the magnet pull hypothesis’ as
they are more central to the argument and discussions of this paper. 
2.1. New Economics of Labour Migration
New Economics of Labour Migration according to Stark (1991) cited by Constant and
Massey (2002) views migration as a reaction to market failures at home, rather than an
adjustment  to  uncertainties  in  international  labour  markets.  As  such,  migration  is
assumed to be a temporary action to enable one to remit earnings or accumulate savings
with the intentions of a return home. Where neoclassical assumptions are made on the
basis of individuals’ migratory choices, "new economics of labour migration (NELM)"
concludes that isolated individual actors cannot solely explain migration patterns and
flows. Instead, other social entities such as families or households are in play. Migration
in this case can be regarded as a consequence of the risk aversion method employed by
households with insufficient income. The household, in this instance, seeks to maximize
income, which can be achieved from remittances sent back by family members who
participate in migrant labour abroad (Abreu, 2012; Massey et al., 1993).
Families  or  households  are  more  likely  to  be  positioned  to  control  risks  to  their
economic well being than an individual. They are better able to diversify the allocation
of resources, this includes the decision to remain, or for others to be sent abroad to work
in international labour markets. This means that they can derive economic benefits from
remittances returned, particularly when labour markets at home deteriorate or become
14 See for example; Mckenzie and Rapoport’s (2007) International migration is costly and initiallyonly the middle  class  may have both the means and incentives  to  migrate,  which can increaseinequality in the sending community. However, the migration networks formed lower the costs forfuture migrants, which can in turn lower inequality.
15 See  Castle  et  al.,  (2005)  this  approach  addresses  the  interaction  between  macrostructures(relationship  between  states,  institutions,  world  markets,  laws  and  policies  of  sending  andreceiving  nations  in  regulating  migratory  flows)  and  microstructures  (informal  networksdeveloped by the migrants, including personal relationships; family, friendship and community ties;household patterns; organizations for mutual help on economic and social questions).
11
unfavourable.  In  developed  countries,  risks  to  household  income  are  generally
minimized  through  private  insurance  markets  or  governmental  programs  (social
security), but in developing countries these institutional mechanisms for managing risk
are imperfect, absent, or inaccessible to the poor, giving them incentives to diversify
risks through migration. The source of income really matters and is not as homogenous
as assumed by neoclassical economics. It also does not have a constant effect on utility
for an actor across socioeconomic settings, that is, irrespective of settings; workers sent
abroad assists in the improvement of household income in absolute terms relative to
other households and aids in the reduction of relative deprivation comparatively (Abreu,
2012; Massey et al., 1993). Abreu (2012) states that these risks may be insured against
through  recourse  to,  crop  insurance,  futures  markets  and  unemployment  benefits.
However, in areas where there is limited access to formal or informal self-insurance
schemes  or  market  incompleteness,  a  greater  propensity  to  migrate  is  anticipated.
Taylor (2001) argues that NELM is the only theory that explicitly links the migration
decision to the impacts of migration. 
2.2. Neoclassical Migration
The ‘neoclassical’  and the ‘new economics  of  labour  migration’  theories  posit  very
different  motivations  for  international  migration.  Neoclassical  economics  assumes  a
permanent  migration  is  made  to  maximize  lifetime  earnings  and the  latter,  that  the
migratory move is temporarily made to overcome market deficiencies in one’s home
country (Constant and Massey, 2002; Massey et al., 1993). Many European countries in
recent  years  have  shifted  from being  countries  of  mass  emigration  into  immigrant-
receiving societies. Massey et al., (1993) suggest that not only have developed countries
become diverse multi-ethnic societies, but, that those who have not yet achieved this
state of diversity are moving decisively in this direction. International migration is now
a permanent  feature  of  nearly  all  industrialized  nations.  The  neoclassical  migration
theory  posits  both  macro  and  micro  level  determinants  of  international  migration.
Interestingly,  the neoclassical theoretical perspective suggests that the labour markets
will clear and move themselves towards a state of equilibrium: it is regarded as a closed
system with discrete independent actors, autonomous from politics and price responsive
(Kolberg and Esping-Andersen, 1992). In the Neo-classical theory, development growth
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is achieved via factor price equalization and migrants are perceived as atomistic, utility
exploiting individuals. This arguably, disregards other motives for migration, including
migrants’  participation in ‘migration networks’ or social  groups such as households,
families and communities.
Neoclassical Macroeconomic Migration
Developed  initially  to  explain  labour  migration  in  the  process  of  economic
development, the neoclassical migration theory proposes that migration is caused by the
geographic differences in supply and demand internationally (Massey  et al.,  1993). It
places  emphasis  on the economic  labour  market  conditions  in  both the sending and
receiving  countries  that  precipitates  the  migration  decision of  an  individual.  Labour
markets  are the principal  means through which migration is  induced;  other types  of
markets  do not have significant  effects  on international  migration.  De Haas (2010)
suggests that it is a system of optimum allocation of production factors that benefits
both  the  sending and receiving  countries.   A prerequisite  for  economic  growth and
development  from  the  neoclassical  outlook  is  a  re-allocation  of  labour  from  rural
agricultural  areas  to  urban,  industrial  regions.  The  highest  number  of  migrants
potentially  migrate  from  rural  to  urban  areas,  thus  Abreu  (2012)  suggest  that  the
migration decision-making process in the ‘behavioural’ model put forth by Harris and
Todaro, (1983) presents a comparison between discounted future streams of real rural
income16, and the discounted future streams of expected income17 should they migrate to
the cities. Todaro (1969) proposes that there is an ‘urban-traditional’  sector of rural-
urban migrants  have  not  yet  been chosen from the pool  of  similar  migrants  by the
modern  sector  thus  accounting  for  urban  unemployment  and  underemployment.
Though difficulties lie in classifying Harris and Todaro’s model as micro or macro, it
presents a ‘‘behavioural model of migration’’ on one hand, and on the other it seeks to
account  for  ‘macro’  outcomes,  through  an  aggregation  of  individual  (optimizing)
decisions. In this sense, it is indeed an individualist neoclassical model, insofar as there
is no room for forces or constraints operating at the structural level. However, ‘macro’
implications  are  that  migration  serves  as  an optimal  resource-allocation  mechanism,
16  Already known by the potential migrant17 Defined as the urban real income measured by the probability of employment
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where labour is transferred from labour rich to labour scarce regions and whereby factor
returns are equalized (Abreu 2012). 
Lewis, (1954) cited by Abreu (2012) in their research sought not to put forth a theory of
migratory determinants but instead focused on the economic duality characteristics of
underdeveloped  countries,  in  which  he  suggests  exists  in  tandem traditional  sectors
characterized  by  the  presence  of  redundant  labour  and  a  low  capital-labour  ratio
alongside a modern sector with higher levels of capital intensity.  The rationale of this
model is that the existence of the different capital-labour ratios necessitates different
marginal  productivities of labour and wage levels, which results in the migration of
workers  from  traditional  sectors  to  modern  sectors.  He  therefore  suggests  that  the
process  of  economic  development  involves  the  absorption  of  surplus-labour  in
traditional  sectors  by  modern  sectors.   This  coincides  with  the  views  put  forth  by
Massey et al., (1993); they suggest that countries with an extensive labour force relative
to capital will likely have a low market wage and those with limited labour relative to
capital  a  high  market  wage.  The  resulting  differential  in  wages  encourages  the
movement of people from low market wage economies to the high waged economies
and creates an international wage differential that reflects on the costs of international
movement.
Neoclassical Microeconomic Migration 
The micro theory is concerned with the individual’s choice. It considers that rational
actors make decisions to migrate  based a cost-benefit  calculation; which leads to an
expected positive net return from movement.   Given skills  levels and the associated
costs of moving, the costs and benefits are weighed and the decision generally made to
migrate to a place where the expected net return will be greatest over time (Borjas and
Bronars,  1990).  Future  net  returns  are  estimated  by  taking  the  observed  earnings
corresponding to an individual's skills in the designated host country, multiplied by the
probability of obtaining a job there, to obtain "expected destination earnings." These
expected earnings are then deducted from those expected in the home country and the
difference  is  summed over  a  time horizon from  0 to n,  discounted by a factor  that
reflects the greater utility of money earned in the present than in the future. From this
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integrated difference the estimated costs are subtracted to yield the expected net return
to  migration.  The  assumptions  derived  from the  microeconomic  formulations  differ
slightly from those of the macroeconomic formulations. International movement under
the micro theory assumes that movement stems from international differentials in both
earnings  and employment  rates  and there  is  greater  weight  in  the  social  needs  and
human  capital  characteristics  of  the  individual  that  increases  the  likelihood  of
international migration occurring (Massey et al., 1993). 
2.3. Dual Labour Market Theory
Massey  et al., (1993) suggest that both the neoclassical theory and NELM theory are
both micro-level decision models, and differs in the assumed units of decision-making
(individual or household), the entity being maximized or minimized (income or risk),
suppositions  about  the  economic  context  of  decision-making  (complete,  well-
functioning markets versus missing or imperfect markets), and the degree to which the
migration decision is socially contextualized (whether income is evaluated in absolute
terms or relative to some reference group). Microeconomic models predict that actors
make rational, self-interested decisions,  ‘Dual’ labour market theory neither posits nor
denies this notion.  Instead, the dual labour market theory conceives that international
migration stems from the intrinsic demand for labour in modern industrial societies.  It
further suggests that pull factors in developed countries are the main cause of migration.
Piore (1979) cited by Massey et al., (1993) suggests that immigration is not caused by
push factors in sending countries, but by pull factors in receiving countries. Under this
theory, the assumption is that the labour market is divided into two segments for which
highly skilled and low skilled labourers are required. As such, and as a result of the pull
generated by the need for labourers into predominantly secondary markets (low-skilled;
labour intensive) migration from developing countries to developed countries occurs.
There  is  generally  a  perpetual  need for immigrant  labour,  inherent  to  the economic
structure  of  developed countries.  Migrant  workers  usually  occupy jobs  at  the lower
rungs of the labour market, as natives are unwilling to take on these roles: viewing them
as lacking in opportunities for upwards mobility.  It is also suggested that the need for
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immigrant  labour stems from characteristics  of the advanced industrial  societies  and
their economies, namely:
1) Structural  inflation-  wages  are  a  reflection  of  supply  and  demand
conditions and also project ones’ status and social standing.
2) Motivational problems- with no status to uphold and few opportunities
for upward mobility at the bottom of the job hierarchy, severe motivation
problems arise. 
3) Economic dualism- advance industrial economies are characterized by
bifurcated  labour  markets,  resultant  of  the  inherent  duality  between
labour and capital. 
4) The  demography  of  labour  supply- The  above  conditions  present
within advanced industrial labour markets creates a permanent demand
for  workers  who  are  willing  to  work  in  unpleasant  conditions,
characterized  with  low  wages,  uncertainty  and  limited  progression
prospects. 
2.4. ‘Push’ and ‘Pull’ Factors
Lee using Ravenstein’s18 early work as inspiration, aimed to develop ‘‘a general schema
into which a  variety of spatial  movements  can be placed’’  (Lee,  1966).  Making no
distinctions  upon  the  voluntary  (labour  migrants)  or  involuntary  (humanitarian
migrants) nature of the act of migration, whether internal or external or permanency of
move, Lee hypothesised a model known as the ‘push’ ‘pull’.  A neoclassical approach,
it emphasizes that there are diverse factors that dictate the act of migration from or to a
place.  It  argues  that  these  ‘push’  and ‘pull’  factors  are  existing  influences  that  are
associated with the place of origin thought to ‘push’ the migrant, and those associated
with the place of destination that ‘pulls’ the migrant, whilst intervening obstacles and
personal characteristics of the individuals impedes or compels the process, among these
set of obstacles, distance of move is always present (ibid: 49). The decision to migrate is
subsequently  the  result  of  a  (cost-benefit)  comparison  between  the  plusses  (+)  and
18 For more information see  -  E. G. Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, XLVIII, Part 2 (June, 1885), 167-227.   And Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, LII (June, 1889), 241-301. - thought to be the starting point of scholarly work on migration theory 
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minuses (-) of both origin and destination. However, a calculation of the +’s and –‘s
does not decide migration as the balance in favour of migration must overcome ‘natural
inertia  which  always  exist.  The  decision  to  migrate  he  suggests  is  therefore  never
completely rational (ibid: 51).  
Fig 2.4. Origin and Destination Factors and Intervening Obstacles in Migration
Source: Lee, 1966 
The Table (2.4.1.) below lists some of the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors of migration that
influences  a  person’s  migratory  decision,  as  suggested by Lee  (1966).  Lee’s  theory
traditionally considers as pull factors the demographical, social and economic factors
associated with the country of destination.  This model was developed with economic
migration in mind and thus has its limitations, however it does offer some insights for
research  on  forced  migration  (Thielemann,  2012).  In  the  context  of  this  paper,  the
author will consider the ‘welfare states’ of the destination countries (Finland and the
UK) as being an additional ‘pull’ factor of migration for both humanitarian and labour
migrants. 
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Table 2.4.1: Push and pull factors of Immigration- Push (from home country) Pull (to Host 
Country) 
Push Factors (Home country) Pull Factors (Destination Country)




• Famine or drought
• Political fear or 
persecution
• Slavery or forced labour
• Poor medical care
• Loss of wealth
• Natural disasters
• Death threats







• Poor chances of marrying
• Condemned housing 
• War
• Job opportunities
• Better living conditions
• The feeling of having 









• Better chances of marrying
With  regards  to  the  theories  outlined  in  this  section,  the  neo-classical  strand  of
migration theory can explain the migratory decision of both economic and humanitarian
migrants. It suggests that individuals should migrate to destinations where they are able
to maximize utility, whether economically (employment) or socially in terms of social
advancement. Similarly if we consider this same chain of thought, we can infer that
humanitarian migrants also seek to maximise utility- that of safety, by seeking the safest
destination  to  re-establish  the  relative  feeling  of  security  lost  during  the  process  of
forced movement. If we are to assume this view, we must assume that humanitarian
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migrants  are  aware  of  and  have  access  prior  to  flight  of  detailed  comparative
information  on  available  opportunities  at  'competing'  destinations.  The  next  section
presents a summary of literature on immigration and welfare states and explores these
views further with reference to all migrants. 
3. Humanitarian, Voluntary Migration and The Welfare 
State
Welfare  systems  in  Western  European  countries  are  considerably  more  liberal,  and
labour market deficiencies more prominent than in the United States, similarly, there is
greater resistance to immigration in the EU (Hansen, 2003). 2004 saw the single largest
expansion of the EU with the addition of ten new Member States. Citizens of these new
states were now able to move freely within Member States to live and work should they
choose to.  Political  and public  discourse prior to  the 2004 enlargement  in  the more
affluent  EU15  countries,  largely  debated  the  consequences  of  free  labour  mobility
amongst disparate nations. A large portion of the discussion was fuelled by the income-
distribution  consequences  of  immigration.   In  response  to  these  domestic political
concerns in the milieu19 of elevated unemployment, decelerating economies, and anti-
immigration sentiments, governments of fourteen of the EU’s original fifteen states20
imposed  labour  market  or  welfare-access  restrictions  on  eight  of  the  new  Member
States.  Many feared that there would be an influx of migrants (low skilled and less
adaptable)  from  A1021 countries,  who  would  benefit  disproportionately  from  the
public’s coffers and become a fiscal burden on their economies (Borjas, 1994; Fachini
and Mayda, 2006). However,  the same young immigrants have been portrayed as the
answer to the flagging welfare states in destination countries with aging populations.
The  very  presence  of  redistributive  social  insurance  programs  in  many  western
countries creates a magnetic effect on large numbers of immigrants, interested not only
in new employment opportunities, but also in the benefits they can access in the form of
subsidized  health  care,  unemployment  benefits  or  provisions  concerning  dependants
19 The ten countries that acceded to the EU in 2004, (A10 countries), had on average, substantially lower income levels and higher unemployment rates than the EU15 countries20 Sweden was the exception. 21 Namely; Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic. Eu-15 leaders feared that the weaker economies of these Central and Eastern European countries would provide incentives for their citizens to migrate in search of work.
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(Fachini and Mayda, 2006).  Notwithstanding, adjustments in the redistribution carried
out by the welfare state are unavoidable, irrespective of whether immigration represents
a net cost or benefit for the welfare system.  ‘Immigration’ and ‘Welfare Systems’ are
historically  both  matters  of  controversy  in  public  and  political  discourse,  and  it  is
increasingly  difficult  to  conduct  migration  studies  in  the  discipline  of  economics
without  consideration given to the ‘welfare state’ and the impacts  of human capital
mobilisation. According to Fachini and Mayda (2006) no other aspect of globalization
has  stimulated  as  much  public  debate  as  the  movement  of  workers  across  national
borders. Even within ideologically homogeneous groups, often-contradictory positions
emerge.  A wealth of research has been conducted on both immigration  and welfare
systems independently, however, recent years have shown a development in research on
the immigration-welfare nexus. Furthermore, whilst the first generation of welfare state
research were concerned with aggregate spending, and the emergent second generation
concerned with the institutional  characteristics  of welfare state development.  Present
research focuses on the social and economic influences of the welfare state in advanced
societies (Kolberg and Esping-Andersen, 1992). This chapter will explore and present a
concise literature review on the question of immigrants’ access and responsiveness to
welfare  systems.  This  paper  is  related  to  different  strands of  the literature,  the first
examines the impact of immigration on the welfare state, and has shaped the debate
about immigration policy in many western countries.  A relatively unexplored subject in
Europe, much of the literature stems from the USA, we first explore literature from the
US, and conclude with an exploration of the European cases. 
3.1 Humanitarian Migration and Welfare 
The hegemonic discourse on asylum and immigration in wealthy receiving countries has
been overwhelmingly  negative,  marred  with suspicion  and hostility  towards  asylum
seekers22 (Saxton, 2003; Buchanan et al., 2003; Smart  et al., 2003). They often depict
22 ‘As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of beingpersecuted for reasons of race,  religion, nationality,  membership of a particular social group orpolitical opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, isunwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality andbeing outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,owing to such fear,  is unwilling to return to it.  In the case of a person who has more than onenationality, the term “the country of his nationality” shall mean each of the countries of which he isa national,  and a person shall  not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his
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asylum seekers as an amassing group of unworthy and duplicitous ‘interlopers’, that are
able to defy many rules that citizens have to adhere.  Tabloid headlines cautioned the
public  on the perils  that  can be faced from ‘bogus asylum seekers’ infiltrating their
borders,  whilst political discourse assumes a default position of suspicion, breeding a
‘culture of scepticism’ about asylum claims (Souter, 2011; Threadgold, 2006; Weber
and  Gelsthorpe,  2000;  all  cited  by  Moore,  2013).  In  parallel,  these  narratives  have
created a discord about the rights and status afforded to asylum seekers, and a division
into two distinct groups, ‘genuine’ asylum seekers and ‘bogus’ asylum seekers (Horsti,
2007).  These accounts foster the public fears around the potential exploitation of social
resources  and welfare  benefits  (Kyung  Joon Han,  2013).  Furthermore,  according to
Moore,  (2013)  they  often  position  the  state  as  manipulated  and  compromised  –
undermined by the supposed ‘abuse’ of its immigration system and its failure to deal
with  an  ‘asylum  crisis’.  The  assumption,  that  migration  is  merely  a  result  of  an
economical gap between Europe and its surrounding areas, reflects the concept of an
internal  push-out  and  external  pull-up  mechanism  of migration  (Horsti,  2007).
However, the current situation is too turbulent to be characterized with such simplicity.
It does not consider the external influences of the media, neither does it consider the
economical regulations and economical needs of receiving societies; instead, it seeks to
blame mobility on labour migrants and asylum seekers (Papastergiadis, 2000; cited by
Horsti, 2007).  The split between ‘desired’ and ‘undesired’ has resulted in numerous
regulatory  changes,  which  has  seen  access  in  some  instances  loosened  for  labour
migrants, and tightened for asylum seekers (with stricter internal and external controls).
Moreover,  asylum claimants,  are  often  associated  with criminality  or  terrorism,  and
consequently viewed as threats to public safety or national security (Moore, 2013). 
Over the last decade, there have been developments and or modifications of asylum
policies in many European countries to ensure stricter asylum procedures, discourage
asylum-seekers and eventually a reduction in the inflow of asylum seekers. The EU
expansion of 2004 and the proposed expansion of the Schengen area saw precautionary
measures installed such as; a tightening of asylum policies, the introduction of an EU-
nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of theprotection of one of the countries of which he is a national’. http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html\ Accessed 22.02.2014
21
wide  fingerprint  database  EURODAC;  to  assist  in  the  monitoring  and  tracking  of
asylum seekers, and the strengthening of the ‘Dublin regulations’;23 to avoid a scenario
of  multiple  asylum  claims  across  EU Member  states  and  to  reduce  the  number  of
‘orbiting’ asylum seekers, who are shuttled from member state to member state.  
The notion that asylum seekers go ‘shopping’ for refuge as though uninhibited in their
choice of destination, and thus pursuing the most lucrative terminus, frankly deviates
from the concept of ‘seeking asylum’ defined by human rights legislation. Yet, there is
cause  to  investigate  this  further;  the  general  consensus  maintains  that  very few are
‘genuine’ asylum-seekers, fleeing endangerment of their lives; the majority are instead
economic  migrants,  in  pursuance  of  a  better  life.  Figure  3.1  below  shows  the
distribution of economic and asylum flows to OECD countries and the change from
2010- 2011.  Migration to European countries continues to originate largely from the
European Economic Area (EEA). In Germany, Norway and Switzerland, this form of
migration  represented  68%,  64%  and  78%,  respectively,  of  international  migration
(OECD,  2001).  Drawing  comparisons  between  the  Nordic  states  of  Finland  and
Denmark, whose populations are relatively small with just over 5 million inhabitants
each; we note a striking difference in the migrant populace. Finland appears to attract
more humanitarian migrants than workers, and Denmark whose immigrant population
consists largely of those with free movement24 the opposite, with more workers than
humanitarian migrants25. Similarly,  Sweden attracts more humanitarian migrants than
Norway, who like Denmark, host a large percentage of migrants with free movement.
The Netherlands and the UK shows a similar picture, with The Netherlands receiving
more humanitarian migrants and attracting less economic migrants than the UK. The
questions therefore of whether welfare acts as a pull for economic migrants and indeed
whether asylum seekers engage in ‘asylum shopping’ are relevant, given the variation of
asylum seekers and economic migrants in Western societies.  
23 Adopted in 2003, and ostensibly replacing the Dublin Convention, the Dublin Regulation is an EU law 
that established criteria and mechanisms for determining the EU Member State responsible for 
examining an application for asylum lodged in a Member States by a third-country national.24 EU-27 Countries 25 This may be in part a result of recent changes implemented in Denmark to dissuade asylum seekers (see Newland, 2005).
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Figure 3.1. Permanent immigration by category of entry or of status changes into selected OECD
countries and the Russian Federation, 2011, and total for 2010
Percentage of the total population
 
The question of why asylum seekers make applications in some countries rather than
others is still  an under-researched topic.  Although migration theories can shed some
light  on this,  considerations  of individual  circumstances  may be paramount  towards
obtaining  an answer.  Studies  that  have  attempted  to  examine the effects  of  welfare
magnetism  in  the  decision  making  process  of  forced  migrants  have  largely  been
qualitative and have returned mixed and contradictory results. Forced migrants do not
make  conscious  or  rational  decisions  about  the  country  of  destination.  Given  the
circumstances under which engenders the decision to flee, ‘choice’ is not available to
them. Instead, travel agents used by the asylum seekers are the likely ones to have made
these  decisions  on  destination  for  them (Havinga  and  Böcker,  1999;  Robinson  and
Segrott 2002). In our present globalized world, large numbers of forced migrants and
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their  extremely  imbalanced  dispersal  presents  a  major  challenge  for  public  policy-
makers. This challenge is compounded by the fact that one State’s policies, aimed at
regulating  migration,  they  often  create  negative  externalities  for  other  States
(Thielemann, 2012). Asylum moves are particularly susceptible to the actions of outside
agents.  These  can  sometimes  be  international  organisations  or  groups  (even  the
UNHCR) organising the resettlement of those ousted from a particular territory (Day
and White, 2002). Alternatively, these moves can be organised less formally, or through
clandestine networks operating as a migration channel between origin and destination,
including the development of important systems of 'trafficking' (Koser, 2000 cited by
Day and White, 2002).
Havinga and Böcker (1999) in a qualitative study assert that refugees or asylum seekers
have less time to plan, or weigh alternatives for the most favourable opportunities. As
such, it is also unlikely that forced migrants will make personal cost-benefit calculations
to  determine  their  migration  outcome.  Instead,  they  have  identified  three  groups of
factors,  which  they  conceive  explains  patterns  of  origin  and  destination  for  forced
migrants;  these  are,  links  between  host  and  home  country26,  characteristics  of  the
destination country27, and events during the flight28.  The importance of these factors
they suggest rests on availability of choices during flight. Consequently, they propose
that  a  distinction  be  made  between  ‘anticipatory  refugee’29 movements  and  ‘acute
refugee’30 movements  (ibid:  44)31.  The  results  of  their  interviews  and  analyses  of
statistics conclude that the determinant of destination for asylum applicants were more
closely linked to colonial ties and to a smaller extent language (ibid: 51). The authors’
caution, patterns of origin and destination cannot be attributed to a single or restricted
number of factors. Essentially, it is the situation of the asylum seeker, or circumstance
of flight and not the characteristics of the intended country that determines the choice of
26  Colonial  or  historical  ties,  linguistics  or  cultural  ties,  migration  links,  political  or  economicrelations 27  Immigration and asylum policy, economic conditions 28 Geographic proximity, barriers to access, controls, checks 29 Anticipatory refugee- this occurs where; the asylum-seeker leaves his or her country of origin inan organised fashion in anticipation of a major problem and threat. An asylum application will notbe successful until the threat is realised and change occurs at the place of origin.30 The 'acute' refugee - where an asylum application results from sudden flight - applications mayoccur only after movement from the country of emergency safe haven to a place seen as a longer-term sanctuary31 See also Kunz, 1973 
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destination. Furthermore, the more acute the situation the less acute the flight and vice
versa, the country of destination is typically arrived at accidentally. There is however,
an implied welfare magnet effect found in their analyses, as although some countries
placed restrictions on employment for asylum seekers, some like The Netherlands, still
receives  a  substantial  number  of  asylum  claims  (evidenced  in  Figure  3.1  above).
Additionally, statistical analyses showed that asylum-seekers were inclined to go to the
richest countries,  suggesting that asylum-seekers go to that country which offers the
best economic opportunities for their future (ibid: 54).  Zimmerman and Fix (1994),
Buckley (1996), and Thielemann (2006) all found evidence of welfare magnet effects,
welfare payments were found to be an influence on the locational decision of refugees.
Buckley (1996) maintains that recent recipients of permanent residency were likely to
inhabit  states  with  higher  AFDC32 benefits;  moreover,  this  was  more  evident  in
individuals who entered the host country as refugees. Thielemann (2008) confirms that
exclusion of asylum seekers from work activity until their asylum claim is processed,
has a negative effect on numbers of forced migrants to OECD countries (ibid: 465). 
In contrast, studies conducted by Zavodny (1999), Robinson and Segrott (2002), and
Day and White (2002) found no evidence of welfare magnet effects. Zavodny (1999) in
a study of a similar approach to Buckley’s determined that refugee’s location was not
sensitive  to  welfare  generosity;  this  was true for both recently arrived refugees  and
former refugees (new recipients of permanent residency) (ibid: 1028). Day and White
(2002) and Robinson and Segrott (2002), they argue that a mix of individual level and
institutions  explanations  is  required  to  understand  patterns  of  asylum  destinations.
Moreover, they suggest that opportunity, coincidence, financial constrictions, security,
family  and  friends  networks,  linguistics  or  a  shared  colonial  past,  explains  the
destination countries of migrants rather than welfare provisions. Robinson and Segrott
(2002) established that actual or perceived persecution was the impetus for migration
and not individuals’ perception or knowledge of life in the destination country. Whilst,
Day and White (2002) whose study conducted interviews amongst Bosnian and Somali
refugees in northern England, found evidence that migration was commonly two-staged,
with the first  flight  to a neighbouring safe haven followed by movement to a more
32 Aid to Families with Dependent Children- a federal assistance program that was a significantsystem of welfare in the USA, effective from 1935-1996 it was administered by states but federallyfunded.
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permanent location.  Glbert and Koser (2006) also sought to understand the reality of
why and how asylum seekers and irregular migrants came to the UK. In a qualitative
study  based  on  interviews  with  asylum-seekers  from  four  different  countries,  they
examined the extent of their knowledge about the UK prior to arrival.  Results from
their  interviews  suggested  that  the  majority  knew little  or  nothing  about  the  UK’s
immigration and asylum policy and practice on arrival or spoke English. Furthermore,
they  found  no  evidence  of  welfare  benefit  abuse  or  any  indication  that  this  was
intended.  Indeed, as contended by other researchers, the use of agents meant that many
were unaware of their final destination. 
3.2 Voluntary migration and Welfare 
Theories of migration holds that individuals move to places where wages are higher,
moreover,  the  allure  of  potential  employment  has  long  been  seen  as  a  significant
influence on migrants33 (Borjas, 1990; Massey, 2002; and Massey  et al.,  1993).  An
extension o this theory is the welfare magnet hypothesis, popularized by Borjas; which
theorizes that the poor move to gain from higher welfare benefits, and ‘welfare’ is a
consideration as potential income in the migration decision (Allard and Danziger 2000;
Gramlich and Laren 1984; Schram, et al., 1998). Research investigating this hypothesis
has returned mixed views, some has shown a magnet effect, (Glantz, 1975; Borjas and
Trejo 1991; Borjas, 1999; Brücker et al., 2001), others don’t (Blau 1984; Tienda and
Jensen 1986; Fertig and Schmidt, 2001), and yet still, some find minimal effects (De
Giorgi and Pellizzari 2006). 
Usher (1977) analyses the interaction between immigrants and the welfare state in the
host country.  He contends that a feature of most societies is that a large proportion of
property is publicly owned. Thus, the migrant, by leaving his country of birth, abandons
his share of public property in that country and must acquire a share of publicly owned
property in the host country. In a theoretical model of progressive taxation, where ‘net
wage’  equates  to  actual  wage less taxes,  plus  the worker’s  share of  public  services
financed through the tax system. The value of net wage exceeds the marginal product of
labour for the poor, but is less than the marginal product of labour for the rich. Net wage
33  See Ravenstein (1889) for an early exploration 
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he asserts is thus the relevant factor in the cost-benefit equation of migration, rendering
greater importance on whether the prospective migrant is rich or poor. It is assumed that
the  poor migrant in this scenario will benefit greatly from the welfare benefits of the
host country (ibid.).  
Immigrants, who possess a unique factor of production, are likely to be beneficial to the
host  country and alleviate  shortages  in the labour  market  (ibid:  1006).  Nonetheless,
native workers are worried immigrants would have similar levels of skills and present a
competition, which will induce downward pressures on income and foster the growing
feelings  of  uncertainty  that  accompanies  globalization  (Fachini  and  Mayda,  2006).
Foreign labour is said to be complementary,  thus bestowing a benefit to local labour
markets. Foreign workers are thought to be more willing to do unpleasant or poorly paid
jobs that natives wouldn’t undertake. Usher, disagrees with this reasoning, he suggests
that some natives will continue working in the low paid unpleasant roles, and that the
complementaries  between  migrants  and  natives  will  disappear  with  time.  The
complementarity he proposes can only be preserved through a constant introduction of
new migrants. The short-term advantage is procured at the cost of a gradual expansion
of the labour force (Usher; 1977). 
Glantz (1975) considered the large inflows of low-income migrants to urban US states,
and sought to identify the key factors affecting their migration. Whilst those within a
high earnings bracket will ignore interregional differences in welfare payments, the poor
are  not  likely  to;  as  these  benefit  payments  represent  viable  alternatives  to  labour
income (ibid: 26-27). Their results supported the hypothesis that the ‘poor’ migrated to
areas,  which  offered  higher  welfare  benefits  and  employment  opportunities.
Additionally the determinants of the migration of the poor is uniquely linked to the
determinants  of  labour  migration.  Individuals  migrate  in  response  to  regional
differences  in  economic  opportunity,  and the significance  of  various components  of
economic opportunity is dependent upon the migrant's economic status. The lower a
migrant's economic status34 the more weight he attaches to these regional differences in
non-labour income when making his/her migration decision (ibid: 35). Borjas and Trejo
(1991) presented an empirical analysis of immigrant participation in the welfare system.
Their findings (Borjas and Trejo, 1991), and Borjas (1999) contrast with those of Blau
34 Defined by his earnings potential
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(1984) and Tienda and Jensen (1986) both cited by Borjas and Trejo (1991), whose
findings imply that immigrant families were less likely to participate in welfare system
than demographically  comparable  native  families,  and posed no great  fiscal  burden.
Furthermore, Blau’s conclusions indicate that the level of welfare received is relatively
the same for both immigrant and native families. The results of Borjas and Trejo (1991),
and  Borjas  (1999)  tell  otherwise,  they  indicate  that  there  is  a  greater  tendency  by
immigrants  to  exploit  the  generous  welfare  states  of  developed  nations.  They  also
conclude that the chances of immigrants participating in the welfare system increases
with the length of stay, although, more recent immigrants were found to be more likely
participants  than  their  predecessors  (ibid;  21).  Borjas  (1999)  in  his  seminal  work
examined the impact  of migration on welfare systems and put forward the ‘welfare
magnet’  hypothesis;  in  which  he  argues  that  generous  welfare  systems  serve  as  a
magnet pull for potential immigrants; determining the levels of immigrant inflow across
U.S. states and influences the skill composition of immigrants.  Furthermore, in a bid to
protect  themselves  against  labour  market  infractions  and  alleviate  risks,  immigrants
move  to  countries  with  liberal  welfare  provisions.  This  he  suggests  is  not  simply
restricted to unskilled migrants, as he ascertains that highly skilled immigrants may also
aspire to live in countries with an expansive welfare system.  Borjas argues that welfare
serves  as  an immigration  stimulus  through several  channels.  Firstly,  welfare  benefit
incentives  attracts  immigrants  that  would  have  not  have  otherwise  immigrated  and
secondly, social security safety net provides a crutch to those who would have otherwise
returned to their country of origin.
European  studies  on  Immigration  and  welfare  have  largely  been  concentrated  in
Germany; however, an emergence of work has seen the issue assessed in the case of
some Scandinavian nations (Sweden, Denmark and Norway) or inclusively in research
conducted on OECD countries. German literature based on household panel survey (e.g.
Bird  et  al.,  1999;  Frick  et  al.,  1996;  Sinn  et  al.,  2001;  Riphahn,  1998:  all  cited  in
Brücker  et al.,  2001) in general, concluded that the socioeconomic characteristics of
immigrants were wholly attributable to the higher levels of welfare dependency35 found.
Economic,  welfare state,  network,  geospatial  and linguistic  effects  all  play a role in
35 This arises when an individual/ family becomes reliant on welfare benefits, as their main source of income and seeks no opportunity to secure paid employment. When this becomes a clear pattern of operation over a prolonged period of time, he/she is welfare dependent. 
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explaining migration flows between EU27 countries- interregional migration, from one
to another (Warin and Svaton, 2008). 
Razin and Sadka  (1998) cited by Baldwin-Edwards (2002) also found that migrants as
a consequence of their low earnings, were ‘net beneficiaries of welfare states. Brucker
et al., (2002) in their research on non-EU immigrants in 11 EU countries concluded that
benefits’ was a determinant factor in the location choice of immigrants. This, they found
was particularly the case for lower-skilled individuals,  who they contend were more
likely choose high-benefit locations. In their assessments they were able to define two
distinct groups of countries based on similarities in welfare usage. One of these group of
countries showed that non-EU immigrants and EU citizens had similar or lower36 rates
of usage, whilst the other group showed that the use of welfare by non-EU immigrants
was significantly higher37 than that of citizens. De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2006), much
like Borjas (1999), considered whether the generosity of the welfare state influenced
immigrants’ location decision. Using data from the European Community Household
Panel, and a model that considered the interaction with and between variables as well as
individual characteristics, they included measures of wages, unemployment and benefit
generosity. Their results concluded that benefits’ plays a part in determining38 location
choice;  nonetheless  other  factors  were  more  significant  such  as  wages.  Baldwin-
Edwards  (2002)  counsels  that  within  all  of  these  analytical  frameworks39 there  are
assumptions and axioms, which most authors are oblivious to, he cites some of what he
considers are the main problematic assumptions used such as- 
1) National  welfare  states  and  immigration  policies  are  independent
variables
2) Differing welfare states have similar modus operandi
3) Immigrants are a homogenous group
4) The  raison  d’être  or  actuality  of  welfare  states  is  socio-economic
redistribution
36  UK, Spain, Portugal, Germany and Greece 37 Denmark, Belgium, France, Austria, Finland and Netherlands 38  The effect they found was small when compared to the effect of wages on location choice, which they concluded was as much as ten times greater. 39 Assumptions used in migration/welfare linkages
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Fertig and Schmidt, (2001) in the case of Germany contradicts strongly the findings of
Brücker et al., (2002), they concluded that the level of welfare dependency was much
lower for immigrants than for Germans, especially for young first generation migrants.
Furthermore, they found that second generation migrants were less likely to be welfare
recipients,  and welfare  dependency declined  with duration  of  residency:  attributable
they conclude, to initial employment prohibitions for refugees and asylum seekers. 
Immigration and Welfare 
Other research undertaken on immigration and welfare saw some authors examining the
extent of immigrant participation in welfare programs. One such study conducted by
Borjas and Hilton (1996), proposes that there is a predilection of earlier  immigrants
receiving  particular  types  of  benefits  and  a  strong  propensity  of  new  waves  of
immigrants to receive these same benefits.  These two factors are strongly correlated
and may be explained by the existence of networks within immigrant communities who
relay information about the availability of particular types of benefits to newly arrived
immigrants.  Borjas and Hilton concludes that immigrant households are more likely
than natives to receive some type of welfare benefit, with approximately 20.7 per cent
of immigrant households at the time being in receipt of benefits compared to 14.1 per
cent  of  natives.  The  welfare  gap  they  resolve  can  to  an  extent  be  explained  by
differences  in  socioeconomic  characteristics  of  the  native-immigrant  populations  but
only proportionately.  Moreover, the immigrant population they intimate has a greater
propensity of being permanent welfare recipients, as they incur more spells of welfare
that are also longer (ibid.). 
The immigration-welfare nexus as mentioned earlier has become a much-debated issue
in recent years. In European countries, many are concerned with immigration from non-
EU countries and the threat they pose to the sustainability of welfare systems (Bommes
& Geddes,  2000).   Recent  research  in  Sweden conducted  by Hansen and Lofstrom
(2003) assessed the intensity of immigrant welfare usage relative to natives and also
explored  whether  immigrants  assimilated  into  or  out  of  welfare  made  similar
conclusions  to  Brücker  et  al.,  (2001).  They  determined  that  when  observed
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characteristics  were  controlled  for,  there  was  a  higher  rate  of  immigrants  receiving
welfare relative to natives.  They also found that immigrants assimilated out of welfare;
that is, receipt of welfare reduced with time, this coincides with Brücker et al., (2001),
but lies in stark contrast with the findings of Borjas and Trejo, (1991) who showed an
assimilation into welfare. Hansen and Lofstrom, (2003) however, contend that whilst
usage  declines  in  time  the  convergence  rate  is  not  fast  enough  to  eliminate  the
differences found in immigrant-native welfare receipts  in the long-term.  Hansen and
Lofstrom (2001), using panel data for 1990-96, find a particular problem with refugees
as  opposed  to  other  immigrants.  Noting  that  an  immigrant  population  of  11%
constituted some 50% of social assistance receipts by 1996, they conclude that there is a
“welfare trap” which affects only refugees.  In Denmark, Nannestad (2003) considers
the  sustainability  of  the  ‘Welfare  State’  in  the  context  of  population  ageing.  His
conclusions do not bore well for Denmark’s Welfare system. Typically immigrants of
non-western countries remained recipients of welfare benefits even after 10 years of
residence.  Furthermore,  the  education  accomplishments  of  second-generation
immigrants  suggest  that  they  will  end  up  in  the  unskilled  Danish  labour  market.
Nannestad attributes the perpetuating problems faced by non-western immigrants and
their descendants in the labour market to institutions of the Danish welfare state (ibid;
15).   The generosity  of social  benefits  impacts  on this  group of  immigrants  in  two
important  ways;  on one hand the minute difference between social  benefits  and the
minimum  wage  weakens  any incentive  towards  labour  market  participation,  on  the
other, the liberality of social benefits exerts an upward pressure on minimum wages,
thus  inadvertently  reducing  the  demand  for  low-skilled  labour.  Sinn  (1998)  also
presents an argument concerning the risk of welfare state dismantling from increased
factor mobility.  The difficulty he proposes lies in the financing of welfare states with
taxes on capital, thus he suggests that welfare states should create competition amongst
each other through taxation on capital income on a cash flow basis and other incomes
on the basis of a nationality principle.  This scenario he envisions will allow welfare
states to attract economically viable immigrants and limit an influx on those who will
present a fiscal burden. 
Myers and Papageorgiou (1998) in a different approach to the issue of immigration and
welfare, starts by examining a model of a rich country with a redistributive public sector
in the milieu of costly immigration control.  Their research aimed to assess the various
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immigration control policies introduced post- communism within a unified modelling
context.  Of  particular  interest  to  the  authors  was  the  consequence  legal  and  illegal
migration might have on the rise or potential collapse of the modern welfare state. Their
study highlights the economic outcomes given a scenario of illegal immigrants gaining
access to public services; they perceive that there will be a rise in the cost of border
controls,  increased  levels  of  inequality,  an  initial  (sometimes)  fall  in  redistributive
transfers, and lower levels of permitted immigration.  Immigration they claim becomes
detrimental to natives when illegals gain access to the redistributive public services.  In
these circumstances and as a cost avoidance approach, rich countries may elect to install
a zero immigration quota. Should they however elect for cost acceptance, providing the
costs  are  sufficiently  small,  a  prohibitive  quota  is  still  enforced.  As  cost  increases
inequality rises and so too does the cost of immigration for the host. Having established
that there are incentives for immigrants to emigrate for various reasons, (poor economic
and  living  conditions,  threats  to  personal  safety  etc.),  we  can  also  conclude  that
immigrants  are  sensitive  to  the  conditions  in  the  potential  host  country  including
welfare benefits. 
3.3 Migration Flows: Europe and the Consequences of Expansion
In the present state of increasing globalization, tensions subsist amongst liberal ideals of
equality (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006). Addressed by these two authors, they propose
that  liberals  are  dedicated  to  the notions  of  equal  citizenship  and cultural  diversity.
However,  tensions  may  arise  if  the  pursuit  of  multiculturalism  undermines  equal
citizenship and the social and economic rights that institutions of the welfare state40 are
meant to guarantee. Should this happen, liberals will need to reconsider their views on
equality and make a choice to either pursue multiculturalism or abandon it for the sake
of the welfare state’s future and vice versa (ibid: 325).  
A change in the 1960s saw a movement of leftist  (social democratic)  parties to the
centre to ensure electoral success; there was also a noted decline in further pursuits of
greater equality (ibid 325). At best this strategic move has facilitated the protection of
the existing welfare state institutions or at worst these institutions are being eroded over40  Public Education, Unemployment Insurance, health and social care, old age pensions etc. 
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time. Multiculturalism they argue focuses political discourse on cultural issues, often
symbolic in nature, and permits redistributive issues to slip off the agenda.  Moreover,
Sinn (1998) argues that welfare states has a difficulty in surviving fiscal competition,
particularly if  the rich and poor are able to move freely across borders.  With much
attention  placed  on  the  importance  of  the  nation  state,  and  ‘national  pride’  a
motivational driver of progressive policies, common dreams and aspirations alongside
citizenship, the feeling of community bond sustains the politics of equality. The danger
of  multiculturalism  though,  is  the  promoted  rigidity  and  exclusivity  of  sectional
identities,  which  opposes  the  overarching identity  that  citizens  within  a  nation-state
should share for successful functionality (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006). 
In  the  context  of  multiculturalism,  welfare  states  are  important  as  a  redistributive
mechanism  that  helps  to  offset  the  inequalities  found  in  capitalist  economies  by
elevating those who are worst off to a level where they are able to function as equal
citizens.  However,  the  welfare  state  possesses  other  fundamental  roles,  such  as  its
ability to serve as a form of social insurance to protect citizens in periods of illness, or
unexpected  losses  of  income.  Continued  support  for  welfare  states  requires  policy
support from those who are better  off  (skilled workers, middle and upper class),  an
embracing  of  the  idea  of  national  identity  and an  affinity  with  beneficiaries  of  the
welfare redistribution. Although, Banting and Kymlicka (2006) contend that the more
affluent  liberal  societies  become,  the  more  content  their  citizens  are  in  seeing  their
created wealth be redistributed into public services and less concerned about economic
equality (ibid: 329). Thus, there is no pressure to increase the redistributive impact of
welfare state to resolve problems with rising levels of pre‐tax income inequality. Critics
though have placed the blame on multiculturalism over their concerns about the future
of  egalitarianism,  although  Banting  and  Kymlicka  maintain  that  the  adoption  of
multicultural  policies  cannot  be  held  responsible  for  the  diminishingly  egalitarian
outcome  of  the  welfare  state.  However,  Sinn  (1998)  suggest  that  as  there  is  little
difference  in  the  relative  cost  of  migration  to  EU  Member  states  for  non-EU
immigrants, their destination decision are likely contingent on the economic conditions
they anticipate. This leads us to believe that these non-EU immigrants may be motivated
in destination choice by the generosity of the welfare state in one country over another,
particularly if the conditions of the labour market bare similarities. 
Whilst the model used by Borjas (1991) helps to explain the potential role of welfare
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systems in attracting  immigrants,  it  ignores the importance of other  determinants  of
immigration such as social  networks.  Beine et al.,  (2011) advises that networks are
effective in reducing the cost of migration for potential immigrants in host countries.
Through  these  networks,  immigrants  can  access  information  about  labour  market
opportunities  or  welfare  benefits.  Another  important  but  equally  influential  factor
ignored by Borjas’s model is that of immigration policy. When selecting a destination,
immigrants  are  sometimes  restricted and are not always  permitted to migrate  to  the
country with the most generous welfare system, even if they so desire. Not only are they
faced with geographical and linguistic barriers, but also restrictive immigration policies.
This paper will consider the implications that both welfare systems and immigration and
asylum policies has on the variations in migration flows to Finland and the UK.  
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4 Methodology
Qualitative and quantitative methodologies are still widely considered in the research
methods literature to belong to two distinct research traditions. Qualitative research is
employed in several academic disciplines, but is usually common in the social sciences.
It  aims primarily to obtain an in-depth understanding into human behaviour and the
reasons that govern such behaviour. It explores several aspects of the decision making
process seeking to understand, how, why, what, when and where to unearth meaning
and  to  promote  the  understanding  of  the  experiences  of  the  research  subjects.
Quantitative  research  on  the  other  hand,  is  about  the  collection  and  analysis  of
numerical  data:  a  systematic  empirical  analysis  of  social  phenomena  via  statistical,
numerical  or  mathematical  techniques.   It  makes  assumptions,  test  hypotheses  and
creates models about this ‘phenomena’. It is concerned with causality.   More often than
not, data obtained for use in quantitative research methods are derived from some form
of qualitative undertaking: surveys, interviews etc. (Givens, 2008). 
Studies  on  welfare  magnet  effects  have  utilized  either  a  quantitative  or  qualitative
analysis, with the majority favoring a qualitative approach. A qualitative approach if
taken would have required a finely polished methodical approach that is both financially
costly and labour intensive.  Moreover, results achieved may be negatively biased as
interviewees may refrain from answering with honesty for fear of deportation. At the
same time, inevitable researcher bias will be built in and unavoidable. Another issue to
consider when undertaking qualitative research is the protection of the human subjects.
However, the line of demarcation between doing ‘good’ and avoiding harm is blurred in
the interest of achieving research aims.   Ethical issues, though present in any kind of
research,  are  subtler  in  qualitative  research.  Through  the  application  of  ethical
principles, which are imperative for any research, doing harm can be avoided (Orb, et
al, 2000).  For the quantitative researcher on the other hand, ethical considerations may
arise in various areas of the research process; from data collection, to the formulation of
research questions and the manner in which the information collected is analyzed and
reported.  Ethics in this instance speaks more of the moral framework surrounding the
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research as opposed to bringing/ causing harm directly to an individual. This research
will apply a descriptive analytical approach of pooled data obtained from EUROSTAT,
OECD,  and  the  ILO  on  inflow  of  foreign  population,  inflow  of  asylum  seekers,
employment/ unemployment of natives relative to immigrants, social expenditure as a
percentage of GDP and also social expenditure by welfare components. 
5 Modern Welfare  States,  Immigration and Asylum Policy,
and Trends in Migration Flow  
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In the last four decades the imminent and perceived demise of welfare states has been a
cause for grave concerns of classical economists. They have predicted that economic
growth will  not only slow down, but will  cease altogether  as a result  of population
growth and the law of diminishing returns on the land. Moreover, they envisaged that
this  would  have  adverse  implications  on  the  economic  aspects  of  social  welfare
(Zolotas,  1981).  As such, recent  waves of migration and increased industrialisation
along with the presence of labour market imperfections, creating overloads on existing
social programs have increased scepticism and concerns regarding the future of welfare
states.  Whilst  some  may  attribute  the  strains  on  public  welfare  systems  to  market
failures, others argue that there is also a possibility of welfare state failures. That is, the
structure of social security programmes in many countries are ‘frozen’ and rendered
incapable  of  adequately  responding  to  the  new  risks  and  needs/wants  (Esping-
Andersen, 1996).
After a society has secured the satisfaction of its members in meeting their basic needs,
and has reached or is approaching a stage of affluence, options and processes emerges.
Man, having had his basic needs met, becomes a modern Sisyphus, forever chasing the
elusive ‘happiness through continuous fulfilment of increasing wants. Economic growth
he surmises constantly creates new wants (Zolotas, 1981: 10). Each stage of economic
growth presents  a  variety of  socio-economic  institutions,  alterations  in  interpersonal
relationships, and even environmental changes are exposed. Sown in the early stages of
social  organisations,  the  advanced stages  of  economic  growth,  when the one-to-one
correspondence  between growth and social  welfare tends  to  deteriorate,  is  the point
where these changes attain their greatest importance (ibid: 7). The increasing divergence
between economic growth and augmented social welfare of rich societies is attributed to
consumerism and the negative effects of growth on social welfare. An increase in per
capita  national  product  was previously viewed as an increase in social  welfare,  and
Zolotas argues that this association between growth and welfare prevented a distinction
from  being  made  between  positive  economics  and  economics  of  welfare.   Whilst
positive  economics  allows  one  to  test  the  conclusions  of  theory  against,  reality,
economics of welfare only allows for the testing of assumptions, generating normative
conclusions (ibid: 31).  Though, he advises that the use of economic growth as a proxy
for social welfare is unreasonably restrictive, and possibly a misleading indicator of it,
particularly with reference to advanced industrial economies.  Neo-liberals, suggest that
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the path to growth and prosperity is paved with flexibility and deregulation (Esping-
Andersen, 1996). The belief is that economic modernisation is eroding old institutions
of social integration. Yet, policy makers fear that such moral and political goals may
threaten  their  comparative  economic  advantage  (cheaper  labour),  traditional  elite
privileges, or social culture. Non-inflationary demand led growth is virtually impossible
to achieve,  given the decline in the industrial  sector;  the service sector is  relied on,
should full employment be desired. Yet, conventional families are eroding, both male
and female are breadwinners, birth rates are falling, increasing life expectancy, and non-
standard  life  course  (ibid:  18),  present  what  can  only be  viewed as  a  challenge  to
welfare states and their capacity to address the demands of their citizens. 
5.1 Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 
Welfare  states  are  concepts  of  government,  which places  a key role  on the state  to
protect  and promote  the economic  and social  welfare of  its  denizens.  Based on the
principles of equality, equitable wealth distribution, and public responsibility for those
unable  to  attain  the  minimal  standards  of  living,  the  welfare  state  is  a  unique
combination  of  democracy,  welfare,  and  capitalism.  Initially  created  as  a  political
project of nation building that provided affirmation to liberal democracy against fascism
and  bolshevism,  they  promised  to  provide  a  universal,  egalitarian  impartiality  and
solidarity  of  ‘the  people’  and  presented  a  ray  of  hope  in  the  war  period  (Esping-
Andersen, 1996). Many countries have since become self-proclaimed welfare states, to
foster national social integration. Scholars are particularly interested in the paths taken
by some western countries in the development of their welfare states, such as, the US,
Germany,  Britain  and the Nordic countries.   According to  Esping-Andersen,  (1990)
welfare states should be recognised as structures of social  stratification and not just
simply as mechanisms for providing benefits to the needy.  In a bid to understand the
modern  welfare  state,  its  evolution  and  complexity,  varying  approaches  have  been
taken. Whilst some suggest that the welfare state is a function of industrialism, formed
to  rescue  modern  capitalism  from  the  penurious  multitudes,  others,  have  taken  an
institutionalist  approach.  Esping-Andersen (1990) conceptualized that  there are  three
distinct welfare forms of welfare capitalism, classified and analysed according to their
characteristics: corporatist, liberal and social democratic. 
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Table 5.1. Decommodification Scores Revisited 
Sources; Esping-Andersen (1990) and Bambra (2006)
Esping-Andersen  (1990)  estimated  decommodification  scores  for  selected  OECD
countries;  these  scores  represent  a measure  of  the  extent  to  which  an  individual’s
welfare is reliant upon the market.  The Social democratic countries (Norway, Sweden,
Finland and Denmark along with Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands) had the highest
scores. Conservative welfare regime countries of Italy,  Germany and France had the
second highest scores, with the lowest scores being reflected in liberal states (UK, US
and  Ireland).   Bambra  (2006)  revisited  Esping-Andersen’s  approach  and  made
recalculations as it  was felt that the estimates of Esping-Andersen were flawed. Her
estimations showed different values for Japan and the USA only. 
The Corporatist/ Conservative Welfare Regime 
39
Corporatist welfare regimes are common amongst continental European countries and
are influenced by the Catholic  Church and the authoritarian  conservative  states;  the
most common among these is the German welfare model of Bismarck.  Entitlement is
attached to  individual  status  within the labour  market,  thus  welfare systems tend to
consolidate  existing  social  structures  (Hilson,  2008).   To  understand  the  historical
evolution of interest organizations and institutions corporatist regime, it is important to
understand the influences that were at work within Europe at the time. According to
Ebbinghaus (2012), there were three influential ‘cleavages’41 useful for understanding
the social structures and their existence in countries across Europe: first, the labour and
capital cleavage, second, the church and state cleavage, and third, the revolution and
reform cleavage (ibid.).  The labour-capital  cleavage assisted in the formation  of the
socialist union movement in Europe, the second, the Church-State cleavage,  was the
motivation  for  the  Christian  labour  movement,  and  finally,  the  revolution-reform
cleavage was related to the emergence of anarcho-syndicalist42 and communist union
movements  (ibid.).  When examining  the  history of  the  corporatist  regime,  as  noted
before  the  church-state  cleavage  was  the  most  dominant  influence,  and  meant  that
traditional  patterns  of  family  relationships  were  reinforced  by  the  welfare  state,  it
extends as far as encouraging single income households through high taxation on dual
income (Scruggs,  2006).  Thus discouraging female  labour-force participation.  These
conservative states were driven by a desire to maintain order and status, which they
accomplished through the establishment of ‘social insurance funds43 that rewarded work
performance and status. Unlike the Social Democratic regime, this regime does not seek
equality;  instead social insurance benefits are linked to labour-market benefits, which
increase  with age and length  of coverage.  Formed and operated  by governments  or
labour associations, they are self-governing independent organizations that hold a public
status,  as  such,  contributions  are  mandatory  and  wage  deductible.   In  Germany,  a
corporatist  welfare  state,  eligibility  is  secured  by  permanent  residency,  a  range  of
benefits including unemployment benefits are awarded based on status and length of
contributions  to the system. There is therefore no differentiation between native and
immigrant workers in the financing of the welfare system. Corporatist welfare regimes
41 Enduring societal conflicts, operating by separating the social structure into collectivities, someof which may represent different interests. 42 The basic principles of anarcho-syndicalism are solidarity, direct action, direct democracy and self-management of workers. 43 Old age pension, health, unemployment, accident insurance, etc.
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influences  migration  through labour,  and are  normally  responsive  to  immediate  and
future demands of the economy, e.g. Germanys’ guest worker schemes after WW11.  
The Liberal Welfare Regime 
Means-tested  programs  and  modest  universal  benefits  based  on  public  services  or
insurance  schemes  are  characteristics  of  liberal  welfare  regimes.   Scruggs  (2006)
suggest that they are characterized by an emphasis on market outcomes with limited
social  rights.  Both  the  United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom are  classified  under
Esping-Andersen’s  liberal  model  (other  countries  with  liberal  welfare  states  are,
Australia, Canada and Switzerland), yet the levels of welfare capitalism are extremely
different with regards to the governing and financing of the welfare state. Whilst the
corporatist structures have been modified to incorporate post-industrial class structures,
and  the  social  democratic  states  emphasizes  the  principles  of  universalism and  de-
commodification of social rights, which extends to the middle class. Liberal welfare
states  minimize  the  effects  of  de-commodification  and  initiate  an  edict  of  social
stratification;  a  relatively  equal  blend of  welfare  beneficiaries  and poverty  (Esping-
Andersen,  1990).   Typically  catering  to  the  low paid  working class  and dependent
citizens, they cover only the bare minimum benefits needed to survive. As a result, the
poor are stigmatized and the middle class turns to the private sector for access to higher
levels of benefits, such as private pensions and insurances. 
The problem with liberal  welfare regimes is  that  they are politically  unpopular  and
sometimes unsustainable in the long-term. They generally exclude the majority from
accessing  these  welfare  benefits,  and create  a  segmented  society of  two-classes,  an
affluent middle class, and a public service dependent impoverished. Britain’s welfare
state today is a hybrid system of government and private industry control, health care is
almost entirely managed by the government with all citizens insured under the National
Health Service. There is though a reliance on general taxation to fund these services, the
enactment of the National Insurance Act 1911 and establishment of a national insurance
contribution  ensures  that  both  unemployment  and  health  benefits  are  funded.
Immigrants’ access to social security benefits like that of the rest of the population is
dependent on their  labour marker participation and payment of social  security taxes.
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Although  stemming  from liberal  roots,  Britain’s  welfare  state  developed  under  the
Beveridge plan, into a model where universal benefits and services were significantly
extended by a paternalistic state. 
The  Beveridge  Report  of  1942  counseled  the  government  to  take  steps  to  provide
citizens  with  adequate  income,  health  care,  education,  shelter,  and employment.   It
suggested  that  all  of  working  age  should  contribute  weekly  payments  of  National
Insurance contributions, which would enable it to assist the poor, elderly, unemployed
and infirmed (Gregg,  2008).  Following these recommendations,  the National  Health
Service provided free health care to all citizens and, a universalistic child benefit for all
parents  (rich or poor) was introduced. 
The Social Democratic/Scandinavian/ Nordic Welfare Regime
Recognized  for  its  comprehensiveness,  far-reaching  abilities  and  its  ambition,  the
history of the ‘Nordic Model’44 is rooted in the class alliance between the industrial
working class and the small holders (red-green coalitions of the 1930s). Expanded by a
dominant social democratic party to adjust the welfare state to the growing expectations
of an increasingly prosperous populace, it embodies their ideological commitments to
social equality and solidarity (Hilson, 2008). A universalistic model which emphasises
redistribution, it permeates all aspects of the people’s lives, and has enjoyed a reputation
for combining generous welfare state  entitlements  with rapid economic growth, low
unemployment and high levels of labour force participation, particularly among women
(Stephens, 1996). The welfare states in this model are considered as genuine sources of
income and therefore inflict fewer stigmas on its recipients (Scruggs, 2006). Within this
model,  the  enjoyment  of  benefits  and  services  are  relatively  independent  of  an
individual’s performance in the labour market and is equal to need. Characterized also
by  an  extensive  service  orientation,  entitlements  are  usually  the  same  across  class
spectrums.  Financed  principally  by  general  taxation,  Scandinavian  models  are  not
merely safety nets for those less fortunate (Hilson, 2008). There are therefore greater
levels of income equality, ensuring the highest level of service and electoral support of
the  welfare  states  from its  citizens.  They have  according  to  Stephens,  achieved  the44 The Nordic/Scandinavian model refers to the economic and social models of the Nordic countries(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden).
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elusive combination of social equality and economic efficiency. Fears surrounding the
maintenance  of  such  generous  welfare  states  are  grounded  in  their  ability  to  resist
changes. Designed to maximise the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing export
sector,  these  welfare  states  are  resistant  to  changes  induced  by  international
competition. International competitiveness Stephens cites is required to maintain these
generous welfare systems. 
To  compare  the  generosity  of  states,  Scruggs  (2006)  presented  a  graphical
representation of unemployment replace trends by type of regime. Unexpectedly,  the
conservative  regime  showed an  uncharacteristically  low trend,  a  departure  from the
portrayal and characteristics of these regimes, laid out above. However, at the time of
these  estimations  were  driven  by Italy’s  extremely  low unemployment  replacement
benefit (ibid: 353).  An exclusion of Italy saw a marked difference in performance. 
Fig 5.1. Unemployment Replacement Rate Trends, by Type of Welfare Regime
Source: Scruggs 2006. 
5.2 Immigration and Asylum Policy and Trends in Migrant flow
In practice,  distinctions  should  be made  between economic  and forced migrants,  as
political  and  economic  triggers  (and  related  pressures)  frequently  impinge  on  an
individual’s  decision to  migrate.  Immigration  policies  are  varied  and changeable  by
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both  liberal  and  restrictive  elements  (Sasse  and  Thielemann,  2005).  Immigration
policies are designed primarily to meet the objectives of a country’s economic policy.
The  interaction  between  immigration  policy  and  welfare  state  design  is  two-
dimensional; whilst immigration policy affects the welfare state; welfare state design
also affects the feasibility of goals in immigration policy.
Domestic Policy Context 
 
Emergent concerns about labour market shortages and demographic trends have seen
some states becoming more welcoming to selected groups of migrants. This has resulted
in  increased  policy  liberalization  for  some,  such  as  is  the  case  in  Germany,  which
recently introduced legislation that allows highly-skilled workers eligibility to obtain a
permanent settlement permit on entry. Comparably, the UK who had long since adopted
a liberal policy towards highly skilled workers through a work permit scheme, continues
to do so. They also recently introduced a five Tier Australian style points-based system,
which radically changed the way immigration applications are assessed for   individuals
outside the EU and European Economic Area (EEA). It affects those seeking to work,
study or train in the UK and re-categorized over 80 different routes to employment and
education in the UK. Depending on which tier, points are awarded on the basis of; age,
qualifications,  experience,  income,  maintenance  and  language  proficiency.  Such
policies allows for selective inflows of migrants. Finland on the other hand, amended
their policy to encourage immigrants’ integration and prevent discrimination. This new
policy hopes to support the development of a pluralistic society and to boost Finland’s
international  competitiveness.  They  propose  to  accomplish  this  through  the
implementation of measures aimed at improving the employment rate of immigrants,
address equality in the work-place, develop the integration policy further and improve
on  processing  times  for  asylum  applications45.   Bisin  et  al.  (2011)  in  a  study  on
integration of immigrants within European states, found that a strong ethnic identity of
immigrants encouraged positive labor market policies that generated positive impacts on
employment probability. However, this access to nationality may have a negative effect
on the prospect of employment and may help to explain why some countries performed
worse  than  others.  Arguably  integration  if  pursued  and  when  connected  with  easy
45 For more information see www.migration.fi
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access to nationality and a generous welfare state generates a negative impact on labor
market  participation.  Bisin  et  al.,  conclude  that  Naturalization  on  its  own  cannot
determine the probability of employment, and may have some bearing on the link that
exist between citizenship or residency and access to welfare benefits. 
Europe  perceives  itself  as  having  a  problem  with  ‘illegal  immigrants’  and  has
introduced several measures to clamp down on the number of applications it receives.
Some of these measures have included restricting access to welfare and legal support,
introduction  of  fast-tracking  procedures  and  increased  provisions  that  would  allow
detention or deportation of migrants. Neumayer 2004 implies that asylum seekers place
preferences on some destinations over others (e.g. Switzerland, Sweden, Germany), and
have prompted calls for an equal burden sharing amongst EU countries.  Finland for
example,  despite  its  generous  welfare  state  and  strong  economy  attracts  very  few
asylum seekers (see Fig 5.2.5 and 5.2.6). Despite the fact that the number of asylum
seekrs in Western countries has decrease significantly since the 80s and 90s, many are
still concerned and are taking drastic measures to restrict access to their asylum systems.
Switzerland introduced restrictive policies that would exclude from asylum those who
are unable to produce valid travel documents, and have also initiated steps that allow
them to share information with the asylum seeker’s home country.   This potentially
endangers the asylum seeker should their claim be refused. Denmark has taken a step
further and has discarded the consideration of humanitarian migrants to those fleeing
conflict (Newland, 2005). 
EU Policy Context
Continued EU enlargement places on the policy agenda a focus on minority protection.
Accordingly, ‘respect for and protection of minorities’ formed part of the EU’s political
conditionality enshrined in the first Copenhagen criterion. Its effectiveness is debatable,
yet  it  is  clearly now a EU objective.  EU policies  have been effective  in  respect  to
migration, particularly with regards to the deregulation of the movement of its citizens
and  the  management  of  forced  migration  from non-EU countries.  This  coordinated
European approach to asylum and immigration policy ensures that asylum applicants
receive the same treatment across all Member States.  The responsibility for the rules
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and regulations concerning economic migrants and family reunification rests with each
Member State. EU integration has entitled its citizens to four freedoms including free
movement  and  the  dissolution  of  systematic  passport  checks  at  conterminous  and
national borders. 
Among  Member  states,  a  variety  of  policies  were  introduced  aimed  at  restricting
migration;  improving  integration;  encouraging  high-skilled  migrants;  or  encourage
financial  capital  investment.  Many  introduced  restrictive  policies  towards  foreign
recruitment,  as  a  means  of  protecting  their  workforce  in  the  milieu  of  rising
unemployment.  Simultaneously,  they  have  also  introduced  measures  to  ease  the
situation for foreign workers who have lost their jobs, by allowing them to remain and
seek other employment. Apart from the UK, others are adopting points based systems as
it allows them a greater degree of flexibility in candidate selection. Some governments
on the other hand are placing emphasis on programmes to attract investment,  whilst
others are being innovative and introducing job-search periods for recent international
graduates to encourage them to remain. Finally, The EU Blue Card Directive has been
implemented  in  many  European  countries,  with  conditions  varying  by  country  and
sometimes  alongside  their  own regimes  (Finland introduced  this  directive  in  2012),
(OECD, 2013). 
Table 5.2.1 Welfare and Immigration Policy Regimes by Country  
Country Welfare Regime Immigration Policy Regime
Finland* Social Democratic – Citizenship Based 
Entitlement 
Exclusionary - Rights based on lineage primarily 
(jus sanguinis)
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France Corporatist – Market Based Entitlement Inclusive - Rights based on place of birth (jus 
soli) 
Germany Corporatist – Market Based Entitlement Exclusionary - Rights based on lineage (jus 
sanguinis)
Sweden Social Democratic - Citizenship Based 
Entitlement 




Liberal – Needs Based Entitlement Inclusive- Rights based on lineage and place of 
birth (lex sanguinis/ lex soli) 
United
States 
Liberal – Needs Based Entitlement Inclusive – Rights based on place of birth (jus 
soli) 
                                                                                              Authors own assumptions *Denotes the countries of focus in this
research 
Table  5.2  above shows six countries,  their  welfare  regimes  and immigration  policy
regimes.  Finland and the UK as noted boast different policy regimes and welfare states,
policy  here  is  based  on  access  to  citizenship  and  whether  it  encourages  inclusion
(multiculturalism) or discourages.  If we apply this same consideration to the magnet
pull effects of welfare we can conclude that the difficulties of obtaining citizenship may
be a dissuading factor in the migration decision for migrants. This assumption though,
may  not  be  strictly  true,  historically  migrant  receiving  societies  of  Sweden  and
Germany both apply exclusionary policies, yet still, despite reductions in inflow, they
both receive among the highest claims for asylum within the EU.
Trends in Migration
Fig 5.2.1 Average annual net migration rates, 2005-07 and 2008-10 per thousand population
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The Great Recession itself has had differential effects on net migration (Figure 5.2.1),
depending on the extent to which a country was affected by the economic downturn.
Average annual net migration in the OECD for the large part remains positive, although
for Iceland, Ireland and Japan a negative net migration was recorded in the period 2008-
10. Others who were hard hit by the effect of the financial crisis were Portugal and
Spain, which saw heavy declines in net migration.  Of countries that appeared to have
not  been  affected  by  the  recession,  the  Netherlands,  Denmark,  Norway  and
Switzerland’s net migration were relatively high, even greater than the period recorded
prior to the recession. 
Fig 5.2.2 Inflow of Foreign Population, 2001-2011 (Thousands) 
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Source; OECD; Author’s own elaboration 
Unsurprisingly given what we have learned thus far, inflows of foreign population to
Finland remains relatively low and steady with no significant peaks of troughs. The UK
on the other hand shows a steady incline. The other Nordic countries of Norway and
Denmark continue to receive steady increases. What is Finland doing right or wrong-
from a welfare state outlook, the fact that foreign nationals whether EU or non-EU are
not beating at the doors of the generously comprehensive state, low levels of migration
inflow are welcoming. However, with a looming demographically ageing population
will they need to implement policies to attract more foreign nationals?  Noticeably the
inflow of foreign population appeared to have evened out in 2008, but has since seen
greater increases in 2010-11 for Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the United
Kingdom,  an indication  that  the effects  of the Great  recession affected  migration to
these countries. Accordingly we can therefore infer that migration flows to Finland and
France were not impacted on by the crisis and remains relatively the same over the last
10  years,  whilst  the  US,  after  a  decline  in  2003,  shows also  continued  increase  in
foreign inflow. 
Table 5.2.2. Immigration flows by Nationality of total inflows of EU citizens
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Intra-EU migration in 1998/1999 saw Italy, France and Germany being the leaders, with
16.4%, 15% and 11.5% respectively,  of EU foreigners  migrating to  these countries.
Choice of location appears to be linked to geographical location, historical, colonial or
linguistic ties in some instances- French citizens represented 26.6 % of foreign inflow to
Luxembourg and 28.3 % inflow in Belgium. Similarly, Germans accounted for 52.7 %
of the inflow to Austria, and likewise, of Austrians favoured Germany. This coincides
with the conclusions of Brücker et al., (2001) who cited geospatial, economic, welfare
state,  network,  and  linguistic  effects  in  explaining  migration  flows  between  EU27
countries.  Fig (5.2.3 and 5.2.4) both shows a representation on international migrant
flow by area.  Europe reported the highest annual percentage change in international
migrants  in  2013 as  well  as  the  most  international  migrants.  Although,  the average
annual  change  was  less  than  the  last  period,  it  continues  to  be  the  area  where
international migrants go.  However, do not be fooled by this interpretation, as pointed
out  earlier  Intra-EU migration  is  common,  with  most  EU citizens  migrating  within
rather than out of the Economic area. 
Fig 5.2.3 Average annual change in the number of 
international migrants by major area, 1990- 2013 
(millions)
Fig 5.2.4 International migrants by major area, 1990-
2013  (millions)
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Fig 5.2.5 Inflow Asylum Seekers to Finland and UK, 2001-2011
                                        Source OECD and authors elaboration
Fig 5.2.6 Asylum claims in 38 Industrialized Countries 1980- 2004 
                           Source  Newland (2005) 
The years 2002- 2005 saw a sharp decline in the inflow of asylum seekers to the UK,
peaking at over one 100,000 in 2002, by 2003, the volume of applications had reduced
by  more  40,000.  Simultaneously,  whilst  not  by  a  comparatively  equitable  volume,
Finland’s  inflow  of  asylum  seekers  increased  by  nearly  2000,  from  1651  to  3443
applications,  and continued receiving  similar  volumes  of  asylum application  for  the
following three years.
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A look at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees report of 2005 shows that this trend
was  not  just  a  phenomenon  in  the  UK,  but  one  reflected  in  over  50  industrialized
nations,  that  also recorded significant  declines  in  asylum claims,  with a  cumulative
decline of more than 40%. Furthermore, traditionally low asylum receiving countries
witnessed  an  increase  in  asylum  claims  during  this  period  including  as  previously
mentioned, Finland. Newland (2005) claims can be attributed to the war in Iraq, as more
than  a  third  of  reductions  were  manifested  in  countries,  which  saw  reductions  in
conflict, increased stability and government regime changes that reduced human rights
violations.   
5.3 Labour Market Participation and the Impacts of Migration 
Kolberg and Esping-Andersen (1996) argues that labour markets are systematically and
directly shaped by welfare states. As such, cross-national differences in labour market
behavior are expected, and attributable to differing welfare regimes.  Labour markets
are  not  autonomous  and modern  welfare  states  are  no  longer  systems  of  provision.
Instead,  they  have  become  employment  mechanisms  and  have  constituted  the  only
source of employment growth at one point in time (ibid.).  Reitz (1998) cited by Kogan
(2003)  states  that  the  structural  integration  of  immigrants  is  dependent  on  welfare
regimes,  labour market structures and immigration policies.  The importance of these
institutional settings‟ fluctuates across time and societies, and each institutional element
is mutually dependent on the other.  
Welfare  states  may affect  immigrants’  labour market  integration both prior to (self-
selection  influenced  by  welfare  magnet  pull/  policy  responsiveness)  and  after
immigration  (labour  market  structure  and  integration  policies  of  the  welfare  state).
With evidence suggesting that the world economy is still  recovering from the recent
economic  crisis  of  2008,  Europe  is  still  burdened  by  an  ongoing  recession.
Disappointingly an imminent labour market recovery is still distant from the horizon.
The recent  economic  crisis  and its  dramatic  effects  on the labour  markets  of  many
OECD  countries  have  led  to  increased  labour  market  marginalisation  for  the  most
vulnerable groups. Among these groups, immigrants have been heavily affected,  and
often to a greater extent than their native-born peers (OECD, 2013).  Comparisons of
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recent  labour  market  trends  of  immigrants  relative  to  natives  illustrates  this  point
further,  see  below  (5.3.1).  Across  the  OECD  countries,  unemployment  rate  of  the
foreign born population rose by 5 % and natives an increase of 3%, the crisis was found
to have widened already existing gaps in the labour market outcomes of migrants within
OECD countries.  The recent OECD report argues that, the progress made in recent
decades my migrants have been extensively affected by present economic conditions.  
Fig 5.3.1 Percentage of Unemployed Immigrants and Natives in Finland and the UK,  2008-11
Comparably, the unemployment gap of UK natives relative to UK foreign-born shows
for the most part a 1% - 2% difference in unemployment rate. This is not the case for
Finland,  the  differences  in  unemployment  rates  of  natives  relative  to  immigrants  is
evident and is as much as 10% percentage points different across each financial quarter
represented. This implies that the expenditure on unemployment benefits for natives and
foreigners in the UK sits close to each other, whilst, in Finland it is expected that more
foreigners may be in receipt of welfare benefits. Unemployment, welfare dependency
and negative attitudes towards foreigners are issues, which are tightly interwoven and
feeds off each other.
-
Substitution of Low-Skilled Labor 
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Immigrants  historically  saturate  the  low-skilled  labour  markets  of  host  countries;
likewise, they are also most likely to be unemployed. In migrating from one country to
another,  unless work was sought and acquired prior to entry,  uncertainties will exist
with reference to obtaining employment in the new location.  Thus, the migrant may
weigh the expected income in an area on the probability of obtaining employment in
that area. The probability of obtaining employment from area  estimated as a positive
function of employment availability at area , and information to  worker, the worker
will migrate from  to  , if the expected present value of future income at area  is
great  than that at  area  .  Allowing for a positive wage rate differential  to be offset
partially or completely by a low probability of obtaining employment.  Given that non-
labour  income  are  classified  as  either  1)  property  transfer  payments  or  2)  welfare
payments, we can assume that even should the worker not find employment, that an
evaluation of the ‘non labour’ welfare income that he/she will obtain in the host country
equates to a greater value than would have achieved by staying in their home country. 
5.4 British and Finnish Welfare State Models; Magnets of Migration?
Finland’s  social  welfare  model  is  continuously  evolving.  Whilst  it  presently  falls
somewhat short of its Nordic contemporaries, its social welfare patterns are converging,
especially with respect to direct service delivery and social expenditure relative to GDP,
which is transferred into welfare programmes. Finland departs from the Nordic model
with regards to the level of employee’s contribution to social security relative to their
employers,  having  relatively  higher  contributions  than  their  Nordic  counterparts.
However, in comparison, UK’s employee’s contributions are still greater.  Add to this
the high levels of unemployment in European cities; further credence is given to the
exploration of welfare generosity in the migration decision.
 Does the welfare  state  act  as  a  magnet  for  immigration?  Do immigrants  take  into
account the generosity of the welfare state when choosing their country of destination?
Is the financing of welfare states burdened by this factor? And is there an adverse effect
on  the  skills  distribution  of  migrants.  Welfare  benefits  are  generally  awarded  on  a
contributory basis  through unemployment  insurance or public  pension provisions, or
non-contributory,  via  income  support  programs  or  other  means-tested  programs
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designed to alleviate poverty and improve the social and economic conditions of those
in need. Entitlement and coverage varies between countries.
Fig. 5.4.1.  Social Expenditure in % GDP over time 
Source: SOCX database (http://stats.oecd.org), own elaborations.
Figure 5.4.1 above depicts the total net expenditure as a percentage of GDP for selected
OECD countries. Public spending over the last few decades has been largely dominated
by the exertions of wars.  The 1980s saw a steady decline in social expenditure for the
UK, from some 20% (approximately) to a low of 15% (approx.), lower than even the
OECD’s average during a period of recession. It sored again in the 1990s and can be
attributed to the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis. Introduced by the
European  Community  in  preparation  for  the  single  currency  (Euro),  they  hoped  to
achieve monetary stability and reduced exchange rate variability. The UK entered into
the ERM, but soon made an early exit  after  failing to keep the value of the pound
sterling above its agreed lower-limit.  Viewed as an economic failure, estimated costs
were in the billions and much was spent in propping up the pound sterling.  Spending
once more begun a slow declined but soon rose following the recent financial crisis of
2008.  Public spending in Finland shows a similar pattern to that of the UK, with peaks
in expenditure during the recession period of the 80s and 90s, it saw a sharp decline of
more  than  5% during  the  period  1995-2000,  and unsurprisingly also rose  gradually
following the  2008 financial  crisis.  However,  it  still  outspends the  OECD, UK and
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EU19+  Norway  average,  this  I  would  argue  is  a  reflection  of  the  generosity  and
comprehensiveness of the Scandinavian welfare states.  It must also be said that the
inclusion of the four (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway) Scandinavian countries
in  the estimation  of  EU19 +Norway total  social  expenditure,  may have  skewed the
averages over time. 
Figure 5.4.2 Social Expenditure and spending Components in % GDP, 2009
Source: SOCX database (http://stats.oecd.org), own elaborations. *USA included as a comparator 
As noted from the above cylindrical chart (5.4.2), social expenditure accounted for more
than 25 per cent of GDP in six of the selected EU countries, with only three (Czech
Republic, Poland and Slovak Republic) reflecting a percentage below 20 per cent of
GDP. A common theme across all countries is the high percentage spending on health
care and pensions, with family welfare and incapacity benefits and family assistance
sharing  comparative  spending  across  most  countries.  Unsurprisingly,  the  Nordic/
Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) are among the biggest
spenders,  with  Finland  just  edging  out  the  others.   When  we  compare  the  UK’s
spending with that of Finland, we note that Finland’s spending on old age assistance
programs and incapacity being higher than the UK’s expenditure on these benefits. On
the other hand, the UK invests more on health care and housing than Finland, this may
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be in part a result of its expansive social housing scheme. Currently going through an
overhaul, it will see some local authorities increase access measures and eligibility for
application rules enhanced. One such Local Authority,  Slough Borough Council,  has
this month introduced restrictive measures that will require the applicant to be resident
within their locality area for a period of five years before becoming eligible to apply,
previously one only needed to be resident for a minimum of six months. Having become
inundated  with  more  applications  that  they  did  property,  drastic  measures  were
required.46
46 Visit https://www.slough.gov.uk/downloads/housing-allocation-scheme-guide.pdf for more info
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6 Summary and Conclusions 
According to the studies reviewed on both voluntary and forced migrants, it is plausible
to conclude that fears about the abuse of welfare systems by immigrants are unfounded.
Empirical evidence obtained from studies on both groups of migrants returned mixed
results, with some reporting magnet effects, others no magnet effect and indeed those
that found marginal effects.  However, I would contend that the welfare does indeed act
as  a  magnet  effect  for  migrants  however  its  potential  effects  are  not  observed,
particularly where an exclusionary immigration  policy exists.  Furthermore,  evidence
points  to  the  fact  that  the  welfare  state  plays  an even greater  role  in  the  migration
decision through its influence on policy.  Given its connection to labour markets and
growth development, policymakers are keen to secure the future of their welfare states
at the cost of increased multiculturalism. Recent policy shifts within EU countries has
seen  a  wave  of  restrictive  measures  introduced  aimed  primarily  at  dissuading  the
undesired low-skilled migrants. This measure, along with the EU wide asylum policy
and control measures limits the extent of multiculturalism.   Moreover, despite the fact
that Europe has reported the largest inflow of international migrants in in 2013, much of
these were from within the European Economic Area. The UK has long been seen a
multicultural society, with a rich history steeped in colonialism, as such  unlike Finland
it attracts more immigrants from a range of its former colonies, due to the geospatial,
economic, linguistic and colonial ties that are perceived.
Sweden,  like  Finland  boasts  a  social  democratic  welfare  regime,  however,  unlike
Finland,  Sweden  attracts  one  of  the  highest  rates  of  asylum  claims  in  Europe.
 Scandinavian welfare states face today a two-fold problem the first being between the
maintenance of a universalist egalitarian model within an increasingly heterogeneous
population structure. The second, that the fiscal capacity to maintain such generosity no
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longer  exists.   Lower  labour  market  participation  and  greater  extents  of  welfare
dependency among non-western immigrants, were noted and may be due in part to the
unemployment gaps in immigrants relative to natives. This was more evident in Finland
than the UK, and may be as a result to the barriers immigrants possess such as lack of
linguistic ability, necessary to obtain employ.
This thesis was motivated by the question of the role of policy, and welfare regimes in
self-selection.  Evidence  shows that  Welfare  states  impacts  on  immigrations  through
several  channels,  it  has  a  unique  relationship  with  labour  markets  and  immigration
policy.  Potential labour migrants in poorly performing economies were found to have a
magnet  pull  effect,  providing they are able  to  afford the cost  of  migration  then the
decision is normally well informed and calculated on the basis of utility maximisation
for  the  individual  and  their  household.   When  all  other  factors  are  held  constant,
countries  with  generous  welfare  benefits,  such  as  the  Scandinavian  countries,  may
experience negative self-selection; as low-skilled immigrants may choose to migrate to
these countries.   Those with a  less  generous welfare  systems,  such as  the UK may
attract high-skilled immigrants.  However, these effects were marginal and immigration
restrictions in the form of policies impacts on the selection decision, particularly for
non-EU migrants. Several empirical studies cited the importance of networks; policies,
agents and social relationships in influencing selection decisions.  Though I conclude
that labour migrants are influenced by a magnet pull, this may no longer be the case for
asylum seekers, the restrictive nature and extensive approach with which asylum control
policy is undertaken in the EU may be a deterrent to those who were making so-called
bogus applications.  
In concluding, I would assert that future studies on magnet effects consider applying a
variable that measures immigration policy effects, as there is an interactive relationship
that exists amongst these three important institutions.  It is also important that welfare
states pursue integration of their immigrant population through the social mechanisms
available.  Integration of immigrants fosters a sense of belonging and will encourage
participation in the labour markets. 
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